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Despite impressive declines in rural poverty in the 1990s 
and a lower cost of living, rural areas of the United States 
continue to lag behind urban areas in income, educational 
attainment, skilled jobs, investment, and productivity. Op-
portunities for rural economic development are welcome 
and federal, state, and local policies have rural develop-
ment as an explicit goal. 
A bright spot in rural economic development has been 
the expansion of biofuel production. The past decade has 
witnessed explosive growth in corn–based ethanol produc-
tion with refining capacity increasing from 1.7 to 7.2 bil-
lion gallons per year between 1999 and 2008 (Renewable 
Fuels Association, 2008). 
Growth in ethanol production has been driven in part 
by subsidies. Federal ethanol policy supports ethanol pro-
duction in three main ways: a $0.51 per gallon blenders 
excise tax credit, a $0.54 per gallon import tariff, and clean 
air rules requiring use of oxygenates in gasoline.
Ethanol production increases the economic activity of 
the rural Midwestern communities where refineries are lo-
cated. Two recent studies suggest that a million gallons of 
corn–ethanol refining capacity creates between 1.53 and 
2.66 jobs, and between $2.31 and $2.67 million in local 
economic activity (Low and Isserman, 2007; Swenson and 
Eathington, 2006). Averaging the results of these two stud-
ies, growth in capacity between 1999 and 2008 resulted 
in an estimated 13,102 new jobs and $13.7 billion in new 
economic activity.
Although  ethanol  production  clearly  increases  eco-
nomic activity in rural areas, it is not clear to what extent 
that activity translates into solid and lasting rural economic 
development. Rural economic development is, in any case, 
not the primary goal of federal biofuels policy, which is 
aimed at energy production goals rather than development 
goals. 
State  governments  and  rural  advocates  have  stepped 
into the void left by federal policy and have proposed ways 
to add rural economic development goals to biofuels poli-
cies. Missouri, for example, has a biofuel tax incentive that 
is restricted to farmer–owned facilities. Minnesota similar-
ly offers grants and incentives that are targeted to relatively 
small–scale facilities (For a more detailed discussion of fed-
eral and state biofuels policy that promotes local owner-
ship see Borst 2006.). Some rural economy advocates have 
called on the federal government to adopt similar policies.
As indicated in the examples just given, policy mak-
ers and advocates see increasing local ownership of biofuels 
production facilities as one way to enhance rural economic 
development  through  biofuels  policy.  Some  policies  are 
aimed at local ownership directly, such as the Missouri tax 
incentive, which is available only to (local) farmer–owned 
facilities. Other policies use a proxy for local ownership 
such as facility size, as in the Minnesota example.
The question is whether local ownership is the correct 
way  to  achieve  rural  development  from  biofuels  policy 
support. We argue that the current justifications for lo-
cal ownership are problematic and in fact mask significant 
dangers with local ownership. However, there are other jus-
tifications for local ownership focusing on the importance 
of productive investment and the institutional impact of 
ownership structures. We urge economic development of-
ficials to remember the importance of risk and to focus on 
productive assets. 
Local Ownership and Risk 
Advocates of local ownership offer three mechanisms by 
which it might increase rural economic development: (1) 
offsetting price risk, (2) siphoning of profits, and (3) keep-
ing money local. (See e.g., Morris, 2007) We critique each 
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Offsetting Price Risk 
The idea is that when farmers own an 
ethanol  plant,  the  risks  inherent  in 
corn production and ethanol produc-
tion will offset one another. When the 
price of corn is low, weak corn rev-
enues will be offset by high margins 
in  ethanol  production.  When  corn 
prices are high, low ethanol margins 
will be offset by high corn revenues.
However,  corn  production  and 
ethanol  production,  though  linked 
physically by corn, are priced in largely 
unrelated markets. For example, Paul-
son, Babcock, Hart, and Hayes (2004) 
report a correlation between the prices 
of ethanol and gasoline of .64. With 
such a strong correlation, it is entirely 
possible for the net revenues of corn 
production and ethanol production to 
both be low at the same time. 
Profit Siphoning
Here the idea is that owners--by defi-
nition--have rights to a greater share 
of profits than nonowners do. Thus, 
while  farmers  who  do  not  own  an 
ethanol plant may profit from etha-
nol through increased corn revenue, 
farmers who also own the plant will 
have access to a second and larger rev-
enue stream. 
The profits–siphoning mechanism 
also ignores the problem of risk. While 
owners  of  an  asset  certainly  receive 
greater profits than nonowners, they 
are also exposed to greater risk. What 
an ethanol plant owner really owns is 
not profit, but a claim on profit if it 
arises. For this right, the owner has 
put  capital  in  jeopardy.  Nonowners 
have no right to profits, but they have 
no exposure to risk either. 
Keeping Money Local
The third argument given in favor of 
local ownership is that locally owned 
ethanol plants keep more money in 
the local economy than do nonlocally 
owned  plants.  This  idea  is  popular 
among advocates for bioenergy, retail 
development, tourism, and other de-
velopment fields. 
However, the keeping money lo-
cal argument also ignores the prob-
lem of risk. The effects on economic 
activity from local ownership may be 
positive  or  negative,  depending  on 
the profitability of the plant. Just as 
a  locally–owned  plant  yields  more 
local economic activity than a nonlo-
cally owned plant when profitable, it 
yields more local economic “unactiv-
ity” when not profitable. To the ex-
tent that an ethanol plant relies more 
heavily on local inputs, those input 
suppliers also rely more heavily on the 
ethanol plant. 
Local Ownership and Reinvestment 
Both the profit–siphoning and keep-
ing–money–local  mechanisms  rely 
on the idea that there are profits to be 
made in the biofuels industry. In the 
profit–siphoning mechanism, the fact 
that local owners receive those profits 
is said to be enough to conclude that 
economic development has occurred. 
In the keeping–money–local mecha-
nism,  it  is  the  fact  that  profits  are 
spent, and respent, in the local econ-
omy that allegedly matters. However, 
both arguments gloss over the ques-
tion of how locally–earned profits are 
actually used and how that use affects 
economic development. 
There is no doubt that substantial 
locally–earned  profits  are  available 
from biofuels production. In particu-
lar,  a  significant  portion  of  federal 
biofuels subsidies end up in the bot-
tom lines of producers, but they also 
create distortions that cause aggregate 
losses  to  society.  Both  the  subsidy 
gains to producers and the aggregate 
societal losses are estimated by Gard-
ner (2007) under various scenarios. 
From  a  federal  perspective,  the 
aggregate societal loss is of concern. 
From the perspective of local advo-
cates and state and local policy mak-
ers--who take subsidy gains as given--
the issue is how those rents are used.
The essence of economic develop-
ment is the reorganization of physi-
cal and human resources to produce 
needed goods and services more ef-
ficiently  –  in  other  words,  produc-
ing greater output or higher quality 
output for a given amount of physical 
and human input. This reorganization 
itself requires resources to build pro-
ductive assets or to educate people. 
Thus, a local economy will likely 
benefit  more  if  biofuels  profits  are 
spent  on  manufacturing  facilities, 
roads, technical and primary educa-
tion, and other productivity–enhanc-
ing activities than on mere consump-
tion.  There  is  evidence  that  such 
investment is a significant contribu-
tor to economic growth, particularly 
investment  in  public  infrastructure. 
(Herranz–Lonca’n  2007;  Holtz–Ea-
kin 1994). 
Of  course,  expenditures  on  con-
sumption can themselves induce pro-
ductive  investment.  However,  there 
are two arguments for directing biofu-
els profits directly to productive invest-
ment. First, productive investment in-
duced through consumption is likely 
to be built outside the local economy. 
Second, much productive investment 
has  a  public–goods  character,  as  do 
roads and primary education.
It is unlikely that the additional 
profits obtained by local owners and 
the additional economic activity as-
sociated with local ownership will, by 
themselves, yield economic develop-
ment. Rather, public policies should 
seek to direct the use of those prof-
its to generate additional productive 
capacity, including productive public 
goods.  For  example,  local  govern-
ments might use their planning and 
zoning  power,  in  the  form  of  fees, 
to require biofuels plants to upgrade 
local  roads  or  restore  wetlands  (an 
investment in environmental produc-
tivity). Local governments might also 
collaborate  with  a  biofuels  plant  to 
increase investment in the local tech-
nical college. In any case, what mat-
ters is not the ownership of the plant 
as such, but the degree to which plant 
profits yield productive reinvestment 
in the community. 48  CHOICES  4th Quarter 2008 • 23(4) 
Conclusion 
From the perspective of state and lo-
cal policy makers, federal policy sup-
port for biofuels is a given. The policy 
question is how federal support can 
be  leveraged  into  greater  rural  eco-
nomic  development.  Biofuels  subsi-
dies provide a potentially rich source 
of resources for development through 
the policy rents they create.
Federal  biofuels  policy  does  not 
directly  address  rural  development 
goals. State and local policy makers, 
and rural development advocates sug-
gest that promoting local ownership is 
the correct policy tool for obtaining 
rural  economic  development  from 
federal biofuels subsidies. This sugges-
tion has several significant problems, 
but does lead to promising alternative 
ideas. 
The  first  problem  is  that  lo-
cal  ownership  advocacy  ignores  the 
important  issue  of  risk.  The  three 
mechanisms  by  which  local  owner-
ship is said to boost rural economic 
development  are  invalid  when  risk 
is correctly included in the analysis. 
The offsetting–price–risk mechanism 
simply misunderstands the nature of 
ethanol and corn markets and is an 
illusion.  The  profit–siphoning  and 
keeping–money–local  mechanisms 
neglect  the  fact  that  prices,  profits, 
and markets can decline as easily as 
they can rise. 
To reiterate, local ownership car-
ries risks for communities and indi-
viduals. Public policy advocating lo-
cal  ownership  should  acknowledge 
these risks.
Second,  advocating  local  owner-
ship neglects the important issue of 
how increases in local profits and eco-
nomic activity are, or are not, translat-
ed into local productive investments. 
There is no empirical evidence that 
local  ownership  boosts  productive 
local reinvestment. In any case, the 
correct focus of development policy 
should be on investment as such, by 
whatever means are most effective at 
obtaining it. This approach suggests 
promising--but  empirically  open--
directions  for  policy  and  research, 
including:
•	 The size and distribution of sub-
sidy rents, 
•	 The effect of ownership structure 
on productive reinvestment, 
•	 Alternatives  or  supplements  to 
ownership policies, and 
•	 Effects of policies on productivity 
and incentives. 
Finally,  local  ownership  advocates 
hint at other effects of ownership in-
cluding effects on power, incentive ef-
fects, and missing markets. However, 
a  full  institutional  impact  analysis 
of  biofuels  production  has  not  yet 
been made. Such an analysis will go 
well beyond mere local ownership to 
consider issues of agency, transaction 
costs, scale, and so on. 
Until such an analysis is complet-
ed, we urge policy makers and devel-
opment officials to focus on the core 
principles of development: acknowl-
edge and respond to investment risk, 
support  productive  reinvestment  by 
private  firms,  and  facilitate  invest-
ment in critical public assets includ-
ing infrastructure and education. 
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